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In 2013, a UN investigation declared sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) ‘the most significant 
risk to UN peacekeeping missions, above and beyond other key risks including protection of 
civilians.’1 Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon himself argued that ‘a single substantiated 
case of [SEA] involving UN personnel is one case too many’,2 and his successor, António Guterres 
has made reforming the UN’s SEA policies a cornerstone of his tenure. Yet, despite over 15 
years of policy development designed to prevent SEA and hold perpetrators accountable, both 
civilian and military personnel associated with peacekeeping operations (PKOs) continue to 
perpetrate such acts.
Responses to allegations of SEA by 
peacekeepers and other interveners, such as 
aid workers or private contractors associated 
with missions, generally frame the issue as 
one of principles: that when peacekeepers 
abuse the local populations they have been 
deployed to protect, they undermine the 
basic UN principles that underpin their 
deployment, such as the protection of 
human rights, and the pursuit of peace 
and security. A 2015 Independent Review 
of SEA perpetrated by peacekeepers in the 
Central African Republic (CAR) asserted that 
‘when peacekeepers exploit the vulnerability 
of the people they have been sent to protect, 
it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. When 
the international community fails to care 
for the victims or to hold the perpetrators 
to account, that betrayal is compounded.’3 
Yet, while responses have centred on 
calling for peacekeepers and aid workers 
to better uphold the principles of the UN 
system, policies have been based on an 
individualised understanding of SEA which 
has led to a focus on codes of conduct, 
pre-deployment training and mechanisms to 
hold perpetrators accountable within PKOs, 
which have been ineffective in decreasing 
the incidence of SEA. Indeed, it is exactly 
this conduct and discipline approach – or 
‘train and punish’ model – that has isolated 
SEA policies from other relevant frameworks 
that have developed over the same time 
period, namely the Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS) frameworks, and related 
policy approaches to understanding and 
responding to conflict-related sexual 
violence (CRSV). This paper explores how 
the divorcing of SEA policy from WPS and 
CRSV, which represent explicitly feminist 
and human rights-based approaches, has 
undermined implementation in all three 
policy arenas, with a view to understanding 
how situating SEA policy within these 
broader thematic frameworks might 
assist in strengthening the prevention and 
response of sexual exploitation and abuse 
by interveners in peace operations. 
Towards The zero-
Tolerance policy
According to the Secretary-General’s 2003 
Bulletin which established the zero-tolerance 
policy on SEA, sexual exploitation is ‘any 
actual or attempted abuse of a position of 
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, 
for sexual purposes, including, but not 
limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or 
politically from the sexual exploitation of 
another’, while sexual abuse is ‘the actual 
or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual 
nature, whether by force or under unequal 
or coercive conditions.’4
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Awareness of peacekeepers perpetrating 
SEA first emerged during the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia in 1993, when the 
number of prostitutes in Cambodia grew 
from 6000 to more than 25,000 within 
a year of the peacekeepers’ arrival.5 
The widespread use of prostitutes by 
peacekeepers involved violence and the 
sexual abuse of girls, leading Cambodian 
sex workers to complain to the UN that 
‘UNTAC customers could be more cruel’ 
than Cambodians.6 The UN response to 
the phenomenon was threefold: Chief 
of Mission Yasushi Akashi dismissed the 
significance of SEA, declaring that ‘boys 
will be boys’;7 mission leadership advised 
peacekeepers not to wear uniforms when 
visiting brothels nor park UN vehicles directly 
outside; and an additional 800,000 condoms 
were shipped to the country to prevent the 
spread of HIV.8 Since then, peacekeepers 
have been implicated in prostitution, sex 
trafficking, the production of pornography, 
rape, gang rape, sadistic sexual violence, 
transactional sex and other forms of SEA 
with both adults and children in virtually 
every peacekeeping operation. As Louise 
Searle and I have shown in previous work, 
it is important to recognise the variation in 
the nature and causes of these different 
manifestations of SEA, as a basis for 
effective policy: raping children with dogs, 
as French Sangaris soldiers allegedly did in 
the Central African Republic, is a world away 
from consensual transactional sex between 
adults even in the context of unequal power 
dynamics, and is different again to direct 
or indirect involvement in sex trafficking 
and forced prostitution.9 These different 
behaviours are facilitated or encouraged by 
a complex mix of factors including: gendered 
power dynamics, gender constructs and 
gendered norms of sexual behaviours; 
the unregulated and insecure contexts 
into which peacekeepers are deployed; 
military cultures, including militarised 
masculinities, and historical military practices 
such as military prostitution; peacekeeping 
economies characterised by depravation, 
poverty and material inequality between 
interveners and locals; the existence of 
criminal networks; opportunism; and the 
shadows of colonial violence.10 These local, 
international, normative and systemic factors 
crystallise in different constellations in 
different peace operations, giving rise to 
distinct forms of SEA, and understanding 
the localised intersections and interactions 
of the factors is essential to establishing 
robust and effective SEA policy.
In 2001, independent consultants hired 
by UNHCR and Save the Children UK 
raised the alarm that UN and NGO staff 
were abusing and exploiting women and 
children in refugee camps in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.11 A subsequent 
UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 
(OIOS) investigation in 2002 verified that 
SEA was prevalent, documenting amongst 
other cases: a sexual relationship between 
a UN civilian staff member and a 17 year-
old refugee in exchange for school fees; 
the violent rape of girls by NGO staff; the 
rape of boys by UN military peacekeepers in 
Sierra Leone; the exchange of sex for food 
provided by NGO staff; and the refusal of 
international staff to take responsibility for 
children fathered with local women.12 The 
report led Secretary-General Kofi Annan to 
declare that:
‘[SEA] by humanitarian staff cannot be 
tolerated. It violates everything the UN 
stands for. Men, women and children 
displaced by conflict or other disasters are 
among the most vulnerable people on earth. 
They look to the UN and its humanitarian 
partners for shelter and protection. Anyone 
employed by or affiliated with the UN 
who breaks that sacred trust must be held 
accountable and, when the circumstances 
so warrant, prosecuted.’13
This sparked the first real developments of 
SEA policy. The General Assembly (UNGA) 
adopted a resolution expressing grave 
concern at incidents of SEA, and directed 
the Secretary-General to establish preventive 
and accountability measures in all PKOs and 
humanitarian operations, establish reporting 
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and investigative procedures, and collect 
data on SEA. All UN bodies and NGOs were 
encouraged to do the same.14 
The Secretary-General consequently 
issued the 2003 ‘zero-tolerance bulletin’ 
for all UN staff, which outlined duties of 
mission leadership to ensure accountability, 
including through referring cases to national 
authorities for criminal prosecution. It 
also mandated that all non-UN entities 
or individuals working in cooperation 
with the UN accept and implement those 
standards.15 The zero-tolerance policy 
has been a cornerstone of SEA policy, 
albeit hotly contested on the basis of its 
treatment of consent between adults (all 
transactional sex is prohibited, regardless 
of whether it involves consenting adults) 
and its implications for understanding 
the agency of local women involved (all 
relationships between peacekeepers and 
locals are strongly discouraged because of 
the unequal power dynamics, even if they 
do not involve SEA).16 
Despite the zero-tolerance policy, military, 
civilian and police peacekeepers in UN peace 
operations have continued to perpetrate 
SEA. The 2017 annual Secretary-General’s 
report Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse included 
the most comprehensive breakdown of 
allegations and status of investigations to 
date.17 It reported that in 2016, a total of 
103 allegations were recorded involving 
personnel in peacekeeping and special 
political missions – an increase from 69 in 
2015. Sexual abuse accounted for 57 per 
cent of the allegations – with nearly two-
thirds involving children. (All allegations 
involving children are recorded as sexual 
abuse rather than exploitation, regardless 
of the specific acts involved.) Sexual 
exploitation accounted for the remaining 43 
per cent of allegations. Of the allegations, 
73 related to military personnel, 23 related 
to civilian personnel, and seven involved 
police personnel.
It is important to note that personnel in the 
three groups – civilian, military and police 
– are called peacekeepers when deployed 
as part of a peacekeeping operation; 
a common assumption is that the term 
applies only to military personnel. There is 
also a widely held assumption that military 
peacekeepers are most responsible for SEA: 
in fact, while military peacekeepers are 
responsible for the highest overall number 
of allegations, civilian peacekeepers have 
the highest rates of SEA allegations per-
capita, followed by military and then police 
peacekeepers.18 Furthermore, SEA is not 
limited to peacekeepers: the Secretary-
General’s reports also account for SEA by 
civilian staff of UN funds, programs and 
agencies, and there is documented, albeit ad 
hoc, evidence of SEA perpetrated by NGO 
staff.19 This reinforces the need to recognise 
and address the range of factors that go 
beyond military cultures and militarised 
masculinities in preventing and addressing 
SEA by interveners. 
It is unlikely that UN statistics reflect the 
true scale of SEA in peace operations: 
Grady’s research has shown that UN data 
is unreliable due to poor data-management, 
4potential false allegations and a likely under-
reporting of SEA,20 the latter of which has 
also been flagged by UN investigators 
themselves.21 Other studies have suggested 
that SEA rates are significantly higher than 
official statistics. For instance, a recent 
study in Liberia found that an estimated 
58,000 women aged 18-30 engaged in 
transactional sex in the first nine years of 
the UN Mission in Liberia – more than 75 
per cent with UN personnel, and more than 
half reported their first encounter happened 
before they were 18 years old.22
policy developmenT 
afTer The zero-
Tolerance bulleTin
Since the 2003 Bulletin, SEA policy has been 
developed consistently, although largely in 
response to scandals rather than proactively 
as the timeline on pages 14-15 illustrates. 
A year after the Bulletin was released, The 
Independent documented the abuse and 
exploitation of young girls in IDP camps by 
UN peacekeepers in Bunia, DRC, which jolted 
the UN into a new wave of investigations 
and policy development.23 These shifted 
focus from preventive measures such as 
education to policy enforcement. At the 
request of the Special Committee on PKOs 
(C34), the Secretary-General commissioned 
a comprehensive report and strategy on 
peacekeeper SEA by Jordanian Prince Zeid 
Ra’ad Al-Hussein. Introducing the Zeid 
Report to the General Assembly in 2005, 
the Secretary-General declared existing SEA 
measures to be ‘manifestly inadequate,’ and 
called for a fundamental shift in approach.24 
The Zeid Report found that the problem 
of SEA in peace operations revolved 
around four issues: rules on standards 
of conduct; the investigative process; 
organisational, managerial and command 
responsibility; and individual disciplinary, 
financial and criminal accountability.25 Its 
recommendations emphasised the need for 
agency systems and processes to strengthen 
accountability, and were endorsed by the 
C34 and General Assembly.
However, while the higher levels of the 
UN were concerned with enhancing 
enforcement and accountabi l i ty 
mechanisms, the field-level staff were still 
struggling with basic questions of how to 
implement the zero-tolerance policy. For 
example, a review of the SEA response of 
the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUC) demonstrated that, 
when the office was established in 2005 in 
response to the Zeid Report, there were no 
procedures for conducting investigations, 
the UN’s responsibility to victims was 
unclear, and there was no guidance on 
how to address paternity claims.26 In 
documenting lessons learnt, the former 
Director of MONUC’s Office for Addressing 
SEA highlighted need for specific training 
for field managers and commanders in how 
to create and maintain environments that 
prevent SEA and mitigates their tendency 
to ‘down-play the issue, or even cover up’, 
and called for mission-specific training that 
addresses the impact and context of SEA.27
This call for a policy approach that focuses 
not only on rules, but on understanding the 
environments in which SEA is perpetrated 
and its impacts, has gone largely unheeded. 
Although new operational directives such 
as curfews, non-fraternisation policies, 
requirements to wear uniforms outside 
compounds, and off-limits locations 
have resulted in a decrease in reported 
incidents, scholars and UN staff alike 
have suggested that SEA has simply been 
pushed underground.28 Further, the focus 
on procedures for investigations conflicts 
with the reality that SEA, like other forms 
of sexual and gender-based violence, is 
significantly under-reported and difficult to 
‘prove’ to UN investigative standards.29 There 
are various reasons for this, including that 
many victims fear retribution if they give 
evidence against soldiers – particularly in 
contexts where CRSV has been prevalent 
and perpetrated by soldiers. Additionally, 
witness evidence can be difficult to secure 
because of people movements in emergency 
settings, and the quality and admissibility of 
witness statements collected during initial 
20 kate grady, “Sex, Statistics, Peacekeepers 
and Power: un data on Sexual exploitation 
and abuse and the Quest for legal Reform”, 
The Modern Law Review 79 (6) (2016), 942.
21 nicola dahrendorf, Sexual exploitation and 
abuse: lessons learned Study, addressing 
Sexual exploitation and abuse in MonuC 
(new York: undPko, 2006): 13–14; 
deschamps et al., taking action on Sexual 
exploitation and abuse by Peacekeepers, 16.
22 bernd beber et al, “Peacekeeping, 
international norms, and transactional 
Sex in Monrovia, liberia”, International 
Organization 71 (1) (2016): 1-30.
23 kate holt and Sarah hughes, “Sex 
and death in the heart of africa”, 
The Independent, 25 May 2004, www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-and-
death-in-the-heart-of-africa-564563.html
24 letter of the Secretary-general to the 
general assembly on the Comprehensive 
Review of the Whole Question of 
Peacekeeping operations in all their 
aspects, a/59/710, 24 March 2005.
25 Zeid Ra’ad al-hussein, a Comprehensive 
Strategy to eliminate future Sexual 
exploitation and abuse in united nations 
Peacekeeping operations, a/59/710, (nY: 
un, 2005).
26 dahrendorf, Sexual exploitation  
and abuse, 4.
27 ibid, 11–14.
28 ibid, 13–14; grady, “Sex, Statistics, 
Peacekeepers and Power”, 942; deschamps 
et al, Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse by Peacekeepers, 16.
29 deschamps et al, taking action on Sexual 
exploitation and abuse by Peacekeepers, 16.
Violence Initiative in 2012, which aims to 
address harmful attitudes towards victims 
and survivors of CRSV, deliver better access 
to support services and justice for survivors, 
and train military and police personnel to 
better prevent and response to CRSV. All 
three of these priorities are relevant to the 
development of effective SEA policy, yet 
neither conceptual nor programmatic links 
were made between SEA policy and the 
work being done in relation to CRSV or 
WPS more broadly. 
It is therefore somewhat unsurprising that 
SEA remained a significant problem in 
peace operations, culminating in the 2015 
CAR scandal. After the CAR revelations, 
an independent panel was appointed to 
investigate SEA by international peacekeeping 
forces in CAR. The panel’s report documented 
‘gross institutional failure’ within the UN’s 
response, including that survivors received 
inadequate care and protection, additional 
victims were identified but not followed up 
to take testimony, and the Head of Mission 
failed to take ‘any action’ to end abuse or 
report allegations appropriately.34 The report 
acknowledged that the Sangaris forces were 
not bound by UN SEA frameworks as they 
were not under UN command even though 
they operated under a UN mandate. The 
Independent Report nonetheless called for a 
fundamental shift in how the UN, including 
TCCs, understand and frame SEA. The Panel 
argued that SEA can no longer be perceived 
as simply a personnel conduct and discipline 
issue, but should be understood as a violation 
of basic human rights and a form of CRSV 
that triggers the UN Security Council’s 
mandated protection responsibilities, 
regardless of whether alleged perpetrators 
are under UN command. Reporting on SEA 
allegations against non-UN forces under a 
Security Council mandate has since been 
included in the annual Secretary-General’s 
report on SEA.
interviews varies greatly. There is also often 
confusion, even within the UN, over who is 
responsible for investigating. These factors 
are complicated by the departure, rotation 
or repatriation of alleged perpetrators before 
investigations are completed and the UN’s lack 
of authority over troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) regarding investigative processes. 
And finally, the reticence of both UN and 
TCC military officials to hold perpetrators 
accountable for SEA underscores the dangers 
of focusing on procedural matters at the 
expense of the broader political factors that 
shape policy implementation.30 
In 2008, the UNGA adopted a 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and 
Support to Victims of SEA by UN Staff and 
Related Personnel, which aims to ensure that 
complainants, survivors and children receive 
appropriate medical, legal, psychosocial and 
other assistance (barring compensation) in a 
timely and effective manner.31 This marked 
an important shift in policy toward a victim-
centred response to SEA. It is important 
to note that although the foundations of 
a victim-centred approach already existed 
in the UNGA’s 1985 Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power,32 these were not applied by the 
UN or Member States to peacekeeper SEA 
until 2008, demonstrating how SEA policy 
has been pursued in isolation from other 
relevant policy frameworks. 
Despite all of this policy development, 
in 2010, an independent global review 
of the extent of policy implementation 
post-Zeid found that very little had been 
achieved. It found that despite seven 
years of SEA policy implementation, 
understanding and acceptance of new 
policies by staff and managers remained 
low, leadership by senior managers was 
critically absent, policies and guidance had 
generally not been communicated to the 
field, and implementation was ‘patchy, 
poor or non-existent.’33 However, little 
substantive action was taken, even in the 
context of the high-profile launch of the 
UK government’s Prevention of Sexual 
30 Jenna Stern, “Reducing Sexual exploitation 
and abuse in un Peacekeeping: ten 
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blue helmets”, Journal of International 
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6The CAR scandal also led to a shift in the 
UN leadership’s action and language around 
SEA. First, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
demanded the resignation of General Babacar 
Gaye, the Head of Mission, who ignored 
the reports of SEA occurring on his watch. 
Then, the Secretary-General declared in his 
statement to the Security Council that the 
Secretariat could not alone address the ‘global 
scourge’ of SEA by troops in peace operations, 
and placed responsibility for ensuring justice 
for victims ‘squarely’ on TCCs. He went on to 
say that neither Member States nor the UN 
were doing enough to report misconduct and 
punish perpetrators.35
This strong call for states to take greater 
responsibility for preventing and ensuring 
accountability for SEA by their troops 
within peacekeeping missions suggests 
that the UN Secretariat recognises that 
policies are not working, and that it needs 
to work harder to co-opt TCCs and other 
areas of work, such as human rights, into 
the framework, although links to WPS or 
CRSV remained notably absent. After the 
CAR scandal, the Secretary-General also 
bolstered the investigation powers of the 
OIOS to include detailed reporting on the 
countries of personnel involved for greater 
TCC accountability, the number of victims, 
and whether a paternity claim has been 
lodged. The premise for this change appears 
to be that ‘naming and shaming’ countries 
whose personnel perpetrate SEA will prompt 
states to take prevention and accountability 
measures more seriously. The Secretary-
General appointed Jane Holl Lute as the 
first Special Coordinator on Improving UN 
Response to SEA, in order to streamline 
SEA policy.
In response to these developments, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 2272 
in March 2016, endorsing the Secretary-
General’s decision to repatriate military or 
police units of a contingent where ‘credible 
evidence of widespread or systematic’ SEA 
by that unit exists. The Council requested 
that the Secretary-General replace all units of 
a troop-contributing or police-contributing 
country in a particular PKO where that 
country fails to appropriately investigate 
allegations against their personnel, hold 
perpetrators accountable, or inform the 
Secretary-General of progress. Enhanced 
measures to strengthen prevention include 
a Secretariat-wide communications and 
information strategy, a new e-learning 
programme for all field mission personnel 
and a request that TCCs certify that personnel 
have not engaged in prior misconduct 
while deployed as a peacekeeper (but not 
in other professional contexts).36 There are 
also new reporting requirements for TCCs 
regarding the progress and outcomes of 
SEA investigations; these details will be 
included in the Secretary-General’s annual 
reports on SEA, and will influence the 
Secretary-General’s decisions regarding 
accepting TCC contributions to current or 
future peacekeeping operations. At the 
Security Council, Resolution 2272 was met 
with resistance from Egypt and Russia, who 
argued the policy amounted to ‘collective 
punishment’,37 but Russia eventually voted 
in favour of the resolution while Egypt 
abstained. A key objection was the unfair 
burden of responsibility Resolution 2272 
places on less developed states – which 
contribute the bulk of military personnel to 
peacekeeping operations – for responding 
to a complex issue that even developed 
state armies continued to struggle with, 
as evidenced by the CAR scandal. However 
the broader resistance by some TCCs to 
the Resolution also highlights the problem 
with assuming that SEA is antithetical to 
the goals of TCCs in peace operations, 
when in fact TCCs contribute troops for 
a range of reasons that may not align 
with the promotion of core UN principles. 
Moreover, some armies perpetrate CRSV 
in their regular operations as a ‘practice 
of war’, which Elisabeth Jean Wood has 
shown is ‘not ordered (even implicitly) or 
institutionalised, but is tolerated for a variety 
of reasons’.38 It is unsurprising then that the 
same soldiers, deployed as peacekeepers, 
might perpetrate the same violence and 
that officials might opt out of ensuring 
accountability. Furthermore, there are 
35 Secretary-general’s Remarks to Security 
Council Consultations on the Situation in 
the Central african Republic, 13 august 
2015, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.
asp?nid=8903
36 Report of the Secretary-general on Special 
Measures for Protection from Sexual 
exploitation and Sexual abuse, a/71/818.
37 louis Charbonneau, “un adopts Resolution 
on Combating Sex Crimes by Peacekeepers”, 
Reuters, 12 March 2016, http://in.reuters.
com/article/un-peacekeepers-sexcrimes-
idinkCn0Wd2iM
38 elisabeth Jean Wood, “Conflict-related 
sexual violence and the policy implications 
of recent research”, International Review of 
the Red Cross 96 (894) (2014), 473.
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why have sea policies 
been ineffecTive? 
Two themes emerge from this account of the 
development of SEA policies that help explain 
why policy development has not effectively 
prevented SEA in peace operations, and 
provide a basis for thinking about whether 
recent developments might herald better 
outcomes, and what steps might lead to 
more robust policies in future. 
First, these policies – including the adoption 
of Resolution 2272 – reflect an individualised 
understanding of SEA, and target individual 
compliance primarily through standards of 
conduct, recruitment standards and training, 
and threats of punishment. As a result, they 
fail to address the complex mix of contextual, 
normative and systemic factors that operate in 
distinct ways on the ground to produce SEA. 
In other words, SEA is understood primarily 
as an issue of rules not being adequately 
conveyed, understood and obeyed, rather 
than a diverse set of behaviours that involve 
varying levels of agency and consent and 
reflect local conditions and vulnerabilities, 
as well as gendered expectations of sexual 
behaviours, opportunism, violence, and 
the cultures interveners bring with them on 
serious concerns about the feasibility of 
the Resolution’s implementation, particularly 
given its ambiguous language and the 
operational implications of repatriating large 
national contingents in the context of the 
chronic under-supply of peacekeepers to 
UN Missions.39 
Earlier this year, newly appointed Secretary-
General António Guterres made reforming 
SEA policy a priority of his tenure, appointing 
a High-Level Task Force, led by the existing 
Special Coordinator on SEA, to develop a 
strategy that delivers ‘visible and measurable 
improvements’ in the UN’s prevention and 
response to SEA.40 The most significant 
innovations of the new policy were the 
recognition of the system-wide nature of the 
problem of SEA that requires response from 
a multi-stakeholder network, the victim-
centred approach, and fostering greater 
transparency of reporting and investigations 
to end impunity for perpetrators.41 In a major 
departure from previous policy, and explicitly 
connecting SEA to WPS for the first time, the 
Report argued that increasing the number of 
women in UN activities, including as armed 
peacekeepers, would help advance efforts to 
prevent and respond to SEA, and identified 
gender inequality and discrimination as the 
root of SEA. Further, the Secretary-General 
committed to developing a special protocol 
on preventing SEA which would include 
strict rules regarding non-fraternisation, 
certification of mandatory pre-deployment 
training, restrictions on the consumption of 
alcohol and a written acknowledgement 
from every individual deployed stating that 
they understand UN values and principles, 
and ‘knows, understands, and commits 
to following the rules and regulations 
regarding [SEA].’42 So, will this new direction 
succeed in responding to SEA where past 
policies have failed? And why have past 
policies failed so consistently?
39 for an in-depth review of the feasibility 
of Resolution 2272’s implementation, 
see Jeni Whalan, “dealing with disgrace: 
implementing Resolution 2272 on the 
Challenges of Sexual exploitation and 
abuse in un Peacekeeping” Providing for 
Peacekeeping no. 15, (nY: iPi, 2017).
40 Secretary-general’s note to Correspondents: 
the Secretary-general’s Report on Special 
Measures for Protection from Sexual 
exploitation and abuse: a new approach, 
9 March 2017, www.un.org/sg/en/content/
sg/note-correspondents/2017-03-09/
note-correspondents-secretary-
general%e2%80%99s-report-special
41 Report of the Secretary-general on Special 
Measures for Protection from Sexual 
exploitation and abuse, a/71/818.
42 ibid.
8deployments. Further, the compliance-based 
approach assumes that robust accountability 
mechanisms deter rules breaches – a logic 
for which there is little evidence in relation 
to conflict-related sexual violence more 
broadly,43 and which, moreover, is undermined 
by low rates of criminal charges or material 
punishments for perpetrators of SEA. 
Perhaps most crucially, the train and punish 
approach obscures the challenge that mid- to 
high-ranking officials – in the UN, TCCs and 
other organisations – pose when they either 
refuse to deal with allegations or are simply 
too occupied with ‘hard security’ issues to 
take ‘gender issues’ seriously and adequately 
resource and support accountability processes. 
The way that SEA allegations in CAR have been 
dealt with over the last three years illustrates 
this challenge. In 2014-15, the internal UN 
report documenting the violent sexual abuse 
of children by French Sangaris soldiers, as 
well as by UN peacekeepers from Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea was suppressed and ignored 
by multiple UN offices and agencies, including 
senior officials, for almost a year before being 
leaked to Aids Free World, at which point 
the UN was forced by international outcry 
to take action.44 Indeed, Prince Zeid, who 
authored the 2005 Zeid Report setting out the 
comprehensive strategy on SEA, and was by 
2015 the UN’s High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, was himself implicated in the UN’s 
inadequate response to the CAR allegations, 
and in the harsh treatment of the whistle-
blower, Anders Kompass, by the official UN 
independent review of the case.45 Despite 
French President François Hollande’s vows to 
‘show no mercy’ to the soldiers involved in the 
rapes,46 earlier this year French judges decided 
not to bring charges against anyone, with 
a spokesperson citing challenges in basing 
a case solely on the accounts of children 
involved, without independent evidence.47 
This raises the question of whether the 
outcome would have been different had the 
UN taken steps to properly investigate the 
allegations when first reported. 
In February 2016, after Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon committed to ‘doing more’ to 
protect civilians from peacekeeper SEA, the 
UN announced that 120 peacekeepers from 
the Republic of Congo would be immediately 
repatriated due to the gravity of the SEA 
allegations against them.48 However, the 
troops in question were not repatriated for 
more than a month after the investigation had 
occurred, because senior UN officials were 
concerned about the risks of instability related 
to the mid-February presidential election, and 
did not want the unit to be repatriated until 
after the election. According to one UN official, 
there were allegations of at least nine more 
cases of SEA perpetrated by the contingent 
slated for repatriation, seven of which involved 
children, in the intervening period between 
their repatriation being announced and 
occurring.49 This privileging of ‘hard security’ 
concerns over ‘soft security’ issues such as 
SEA throws into question the extent to which 
military and other UN officials are willing to 
genuinely implement more heavy-handed SEA 
policies such as those laid out in Resolution 
2272, which was formally adopted after the 
initial CAR repatriation announcement just 
discussed. Secretary-General António Guterres 
committed himself to making protection from 
SEA one of his key priorities in his first week 
in office in 2017, declaring that ‘such acts of 
cruelty should never take place. Certainly, no 
person serving within the United Nations in 
any capacity should be associated with such 
vile and vicious crimes.’50 
+ 
SEA is understood primarily as an issue of rules not 
being adequately conveyed, understood and obeyed, 
rather than a diverse set of behaviours that involve 
varying levels of agency and consent and reflect local 
conditions and vulnerabilities, as well as gendered 
expectations of sexual behaviours, opportunism, 
violence, and the cultures interveners bring with them 
on deployments.
43 Paul kirby, “ending Sexual Violence in 
Conflict: the Preventing Sexual Violence 
initiative and its Critics”, International 
Affairs 91 (3) (2015), 464.
44 for the full set of leaked documents, see 
www.codebluecampaign.com/undocuments
45 deschamps et al, taking action on Sea by 
Peacekeepers, viii.
46 angelique Chrisafis and Sandra laville, 
“hollande: no Mercy over Claims french 
Soldiers abused Children in CaR”, the 
guardian, 30 april 2015, www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/apr/30/hollande-no-mercy-
over-allegations-of-child-abuse-in-car-by-
french-soldiers
47 benoît Morenne, “no Charges in Sexual 
abuse Case involving french Peacekeepers”, 
nY times, 6 January 2017, www.nytimes.
com/2017/01/06/world/africa/french-
peacekeepers-un-sexual-abuse-case-central-
african-republic.html?nytmobile=0
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against un Peacekeepers in Central african 
Republic”, un news Service, 4 february 
2016, www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?newsid=53163
49 unWomen official, Personal interview, new 
York, november 2, 2016.
50 Secretary-general’s note to Correspondents.
Yet, despite the Secretary-General’s strong 
commitment and attempts to build political 
will at all levels of the Secretariat and among 
Member States, new revelations about SEA in 
CAR in June 2017 suggest that some officials 
continue to block effective policy. The Code 
Blue Campaign at Aids Free World published 
leaked confidential UN documents from mid-
May that included a detailed report of sexual 
and other misconduct by the Congolese 
battalion in the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR 
(MINUSCA), and an official facsimile from 
the Force Commander noting that despite 
the repatriation of the former battalion 
commander and troops in 2016, the battalion 
has not improved and remains ‘notorious 
for SEA misconducts, fuel trafficking and 
poor discipline’ and requested that they be 
repatriated if Congo could not immediately 
improve the unit’s standard.51 The letter was 
sent to Lt. Gen. Loitey, Military Advisor for 
PKOs in the Office for Military Affairs at the 
Department for Peacekeeping Operations, 
who sits on the Secretary-General’s new High-
Level Task Force overseeing the UN’s reformed 
approach to SEA policy, and yet no action 
was taken by the Secretariat until 20 June, 
two weeks after the leaked documents were 
published. These three examples demonstrate 
that, despite policy development, one of 
the most significant challenges to effective 
SEA policy is the willingness of officials to 
enforce it; a challenge papered over by the 
individualised, train and punish model of SEA 
that has been developed to date. They also 
further illustrate the UN tendency to respond 
to SEA when prompted by public outcry and 
media revelations, rather than proactively. 
The second, related theme emerging from my 
analysis of SEA policy development is that the 
individualised approach to understanding SEA 
has isolated policy from other relevant thematic 
agendas and operational frameworks, most 
notably WPS, but also CRSV and Protection of 
Civilians (POC), by focusing policy on conduct 
and discipline rather than broader issues of 
gender, protection and human rights. It is 
notable that Resolution 2272 was not listed 
as a WPS resolution, even though it has clear 
synergies with that part of the Council’s body 
of work, and includes a mandate for WPS 
mechanisms to include SEA allegations in 
reporting to the Secretary-General.52 In fact, 
SEA remains listed on the UN Peacekeeping 
website as a conduct and discipline issue only, 
despite the multiple calls from both within and 
outside the UN for it to be understood more 
broadly. Indeed, SEA is siloed from POC and 
WPS references in mission mandates, and was 
not included in the annual Secretary-General’s 
reports on conflict-related sexual violence 
and children and armed conflict until after 
the CAR scandal. 
It is important to note however, that although 
it took some time for those working in the 
WPS policy space to recognise SEA as within 
the purview of WPS, that has changed 
significantly in recent years. For example, the 
2015 Global Study on 1325 gave significant 
attention to SEA, arguing strongly that greater 
women’s presence in peace operations was 
crucial to reducing incidences of SEA;53 
this argument has since been reiterated by 
Secretary-General Guterres. Despite these 
moves from the WPS side, it appears that 
most SEA policy development continues to 
be pursued in ways isolated from the larger 
WPS body of work. 
implicaTions of 
isolaTing sea from wps 
So what are the impacts of this delinking of SEA 
policy from the WPS framework more broadly? 
First, by dealing with SEA as an individualised 
conduct and discipline issue only, policies 
and their implementers are constrained in 
addressing the structural gender inequalities 
that shape the choices made by perpetrators 
(and sometimes, their victims). The challenges 
of the UN’s policy regarding transactional 
sex are illustrative of this lack of sensitivity 
to gender experiences and constructs. The 
zero-tolerance bulletin explicitly prohibits any 
‘exchange of money, employment, goods, or 
services for sex’. However, peace operations 
are normally deployed into contexts where 
the intersection of conflict-related sexual 
51 these leaked documents are also 
available at www.codebluecampaign.com/
undocuments/
52 S/ReS/2272, 13.
53 Radhika Coomaraswamy et al., Preventing 
Conflict, transforming Justice, Securing the 
Peace: a global Study on the implementation 
of united nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 (nY: unWomen, 2015).
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violence and associated stigma, gender 
inequality, and material deprivation, creates 
the conditions for ‘survival’ sex economies 
to emerge and flourish. A key characteristic 
of transactional sex is that it ‘involves a level 
of agency and negotiation’ even though it is 
negotiated in the context of often-extreme 
deprivation, desperation, and insecurity.54 
Without incorporating a gender analysis into 
training materials, guidelines and approaches 
to SEA, it is difficult to make sense of the way 
this agency operates, and its implications 
for regulating sexual interactions between 
interveners and locals. So, for instance, despite 
receiving mandatory training on the UN code 
of conduct that prohibits transactional sex, 
some peacekeepers have argued to Paul 
Higate that their sexual ‘transactions’ were 
acceptable because women ‘enthusiastically’ 
competed to attract their attention, or 
because the ‘donated’ food, resources or 
money made the women involved more 
secure.55 That some parents encourage their 
child’s participation in transactional sex as 
a way of securing their family’s economic 
survival may bolster this impression.56 This 
illuminates the disconnect between the list 
of rules that peacekeepers are expected to 
follow, which is conveyed in mandatory pre-
deployment training, and their understanding 
of why those rules are important. Situating 
SEA policy within a gendered analysis of 
power, vulnerability and agency – such as 
that embodied in the WPS framework – would 
not only give interveners the language and 
concepts necessary to understand the multiple 
dimensions of transactional sex and better 
navigate their interactions with locals, but 
would help eschew the ‘women as victims’ 
mentality that the policy currently reinforces. 
Another implication of the isolation of SEA 
policy from WPS is the tension created 
between protection and participation in 
the implementation of SEA policy. One 
of the most controversial provisions in the 
zero-tolerance bulletin asserts that ‘sexual 
relationships between United Nations staff 
and beneficiaries of assistance, since they 
are based on inherently unequal power 
dynamics, undermine the credibility and 
integrity of the work of the United Nations 
and are strongly discouraged.’57 Putting aside 
the unenforceability of this provision,58 this 
suggests that no adults in conflict-affected 
communities have the capacity to consent 
in the context of unequal power dynamics, 
which is infantilising and disempowering. 
Given that the policy is primarily understood 
to relate to relationships with local women 
(although relationships with local men fall 
under the same rule, the power dynamics 
between international women and local 
men tend to be understood as having less 
problematic power differentials59) it stands in 
direct tension with the values that underpin 
the WPS framework. These hold that women 
can exert agency even in the context of 
the particular vulnerabilities they face in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, and have 
valuable contributions to make to local and 
national processes of decision-making and 
peace-making. It is hardly surprising that 
there have been so few gains in convincing 
peacekeepers and policy-makers to ensure 
the full and active participation of women in 
peace processes if the same people receive 
training that reinforces the idea that adult 
women in conflict contexts are so vulnerable 
they cannot make choices for themselves 
about relationships they enter into. Ultimately, 
the current conduct and discipline approach 
to SEA fails to equip peacekeepers with the 
concepts and language required to navigate 
the complexities of relationships with locals, 
including distinguishing between exploitative 
and non-exploitative relationships. 
This raises two issues for policy-makers, the 
first of which is how to improve training 
approaches in order to provide peacekeepers 
with the conceptual foundations to 
understand why certain forms of interactions 
with locals are problematic and may be 
exploitative even if consent appears to be 
present, and how to co-opt supervisors and 
managers into supporting robust discussions 
about these interactions and decisions 
while on deployment. Second, it raises the 
question of whether current definitions of 
prohibited and discouraged behaviours, as 
contained in the zero-tolerance bulletin, 
54 otto, “Making Sense of Zero tolerance 
Policies”: 260–61.
55 higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and 
Sexual exploitation”: 100–107.
56 Save the Children uk, From Camp to 
Community: Liberia Study on Exploitation 
of Children (london: Save the Children uk, 
2006), 13.
57 St/Sgb/2003/13, para. 3(d).
58 for a more detailed discussion of this, 
see Jasmine-kim Westendorf, “Sexual 
exploitation and abuse in Peace operations: 
Viewing from the Perspective of WPS”, in 
Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and 
Security, ed Jacqui true and Sara davies 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2018).
59 this was borne out in many of the 
interviews conducted during this project in 
east timor, bosnia-herzegovina, geneva and 
new York.
strike an appropriate balance between 
setting up protective mechanisms that limit 
what peacekeepers are permitted to do, and 
undermining the agency of local individuals 
in establishing adult, consensual relationships 
with peacekeepers. The zero-tolerance 
bulletin is, in essence, an administrative 
policy, developed in 2003 in response to 
major SEA scandals, which has attained 
quasi-legal standing: it is being used as a basis 
for legal accountability processes, despite not 
having the internal coherence and clarity 
that would normally be expected of legal 
regulations. Revising it in order to improve 
clarity of the rules, and resolve contradictions 
with other frameworks, particularly WPS, 
may set the foundations for more effective 
policy implementation in future. 
A third implication of the disconnect 
between SEA and WPS policy is that SEA 
policy has also been disconnected from the 
body of policy and operational work on 
CRSV that stemmed from two WPS Security 
Council Resolutions. In 2008, Resolution 
1820 explicitly linked CRSV and WPS, and 
in 2009, Resolution 1888 mandated that 
peacekeepers protect women and children 
from CRSV and established the Office of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. 
These resolutions firmly established CRSV as 
a crime that is preventable and punishable 
under international human rights law, and 
have led to work to strengthen criminal 
accountability for CRSV, responsiveness to 
survivors, and judicial capacity. Key obstacles 
regarding accountability for SEA include the 
difficulty of collecting evidence in relation to 
allegations that satisfy legal standards, and 
generating political will to hold perpetrators 
criminally accountable under national legal 
frameworks. The operational and policy 
work being done under the CRSV umbrella 
is already addressing these challenges, but 
the connection has not yet been made to SEA 
accountability mechanisms. Indeed, the first 
recommendation of the Independent Review 
of the CAR SEA scandal was that:
‘The most significant step the UN can take to 
improve its responses to allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is 
to acknowledge that such abuses are a form 
of conflict related sexual violence that must 
be addressed under the UN’s human rights 
policies. To acknowledge and operationalize 
the UN’s obligations to protect victims, report, 
investigate, and follow up on allegations, 
and ensure that perpetrators are held 
accountable, the SEA and human rights 
policy frameworks must be harmonized 
under a unified policy framework.’60
It is clear from this analysis that linking SEA 
policy with WPS, and thereby also CRSV, 
on both conceptual and operational levels 
would be a significant step in reorienting it 
away from the individualised, conduct and 
discipline framing of ‘the problem’, which is 
a key reason policies have been ineffective 
to date. This would help on two fronts: 
prevention and response policies would 
benefit from being situated within the WPS 
frame of gender, power and protection 
issues, while accountability mechanisms 
would be strengthened by closer integration 
with CRSV frameworks. In other words, links 
to CRSV would strengthen the grounding 
of SEA in human rights and accountability 
frameworks, while links to WPS would provide 
the crucial grounding in feminist analysis, 
which is required for individuals to navigate 
the inevitably complex interpretation and 
implementation of SEA policies in practice. 
If SEA policies and training drew on the 
language of gender and power, and the 
conceptual framework around women’s 
roles and vulnerabilities in conflict and peace 
processes – which are the foundation of the 
WPS agenda and currently absent from SEA 
policy discourse – peacekeepers would be 
equipped with an understanding of why the 
SEA rules are important rather than simply 
what the rules are. Furthermore, couching 
SEA policy within the broader WPS framework 
and language would give peacekeepers and 
those involved in SEA accountability processes 
a conceptual framework for how to navigate 
the sometimes complicated negotiation 
60 deschamps et al, taking action on Sea by 
Peacekeepers, x.
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of relationships with local individuals and 
communities, particularly sexual relationships 
that are consensual, but sometimes involve 
transactions, and where consent does not rest 
on equal, non-hierarchical power relations. 
Importantly, this conceptual framework 
would help prevent the infantilisation and 
disempowerment of women by foregrounding 
their agency, while providing peacekeepers 
with an understanding of the gendered, 
racialised and economic context in which it 
may be exercised. Equipping peacekeepers 
with a language of power dynamics – which 
can encompass gender, race and economics 
– and a lens through which to make sense of 
their own role and position in peacekeeping 
contexts, is crucial to preventing and ensuring 
accountability for SEA. It would provide all 
personnel involved – including military, policy 
and civilian peacekeepers, the UN Secretariat, 
TCCs and UN Funds and Agencies – with a 
better grounding from which to understand 
why certain behaviours are unacceptable in the 
context of peacekeeping operations, identify 
SEA and hold perpetrators accountable for 
violations of the zero-tolerance policy. The 
current approach provides a list of prohibited 
and discouraged behaviours, which belies 
the reality that navigating the permissibility 
or exploitative nature of sexual interactions 
that take place in the complex and unequal 
contexts into which peace operations are 
deployed is, in practice, less clear-cut than 
the current SEA policy approach suggests. 
While prevention and response policies 
would benefit greatly from being couched 
within the language and concepts of WPS, 
accountability processes and mechanisms 
would be significantly improved through a 
closer integration with CRSV frameworks, 
which would assist in addressing the practical, 
political and legal challenges to holding 
perpetrators accountable. Recognising 
those types of SEA that are criminal – for 
instance sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of 
children and trafficking61 – as forms of CRSV, 
which require a robust, human rights-based 
criminal legal response and demands the 
foregrounding of victim needs, would be 
an important step in strengthening current 
accountability mechanisms. Work already 
being done within the Office of the Special 
Coordinator for SEA to streamline and 
standardise reporting, data collection and 
referral processes is an important step in this 
direction, and would be bolstered by explicit 
connections with similar work being done 
in relation to CRSV. Further, if integrated 
into the Special Representative on Sexual 
Violence’s work, SEA would benefit from 
the political mobilisation the Representative 
undertakes to ensure states hold their citizens 
accountable for crimes of sexual violence in 
conflict contexts. 
conclusions
The individualisation of SEA and resultant 
focus on conduct and disciplinary responses 
reflects a broader trend related to gender 
issues, namely that technocratic ‘fixes’ 
have been prioritised over efforts that 
address the underlying causes of gendered 
inequality and violence.62 By focusing on the 
technocratic responses to peacekeeper SEA 
– namely training on rules and regulations, 
administrative procedures for investigation of 
allegations and their associated bureaucratic 
structures – the international community 
appears to be taking concrete steps to address 
SEA, while inadvertently reinforcing the image 
of local women and children as victims lacking 
agency, and torpedoing more nuanced 
understandings of and responses to SEA in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts. Sam Cook 
has shown how this works in relation to WPS 
more broadly, with the foregrounding of the 
‘woman-in-conflict’ at the expense of the 
broader concerns of the WPS agenda.63 This is 
not to suggest that the narrowing of focus is 
a deliberate strategy to avoid dealing with the 
hardest aspects of intervener SEA, but rather 
that it is the consequence of bureaucratic and 
political pressures within the international 
system to focus on measurable, technocratic 
solutions.64
That the narrowing of focus to technocratic 
responses has led to the isolation of SEA 
policy from WPS and CRSV agendas and 
frameworks is of particular concern as it robs 
61 for a discussion that breaks down the 
different forms of Sea, see Westendorf and 
Searle, “Sexual exploitation and abuse in 
Peace operations”.
62 Mona lena krook and Jacqui true, 
“Rethinking the life Cycles of international 
norms: the united nations and the global 
Promotion of gender equality”, European 
Journal of International Relations 18 (1) 
(2012): 115–17.
63 Sam Cook, “the ‘Woman-in-Conflict’at the 
un Security Council: a Subject of Practice”, 
International Affairs 92 (2) (2016): 353–372.
64 for a more detailed discussion of these 
pressures, see Westendorf and Searle, 
“Sexual exploitation and abuse in Peace 
operations”: 383–85.
SEA policy of what would be a profitable 
grounding in feminist analysis and policy, and 
a more explicitly intersectional and human 
rights-based approach to understanding 
the causes and consequences of SEA, 
and developing robust prevention and 
accountability processes. Moreover, the gap 
in political will to ensure accountability for SEA 
runs in parallel to the lack of political will to 
realise the goals set out in the WPS framework 
around women’s participation and protection 
more broadly, including in relation to CRSV, 
and aligning these three areas of policy work 
would ensure that gains made in one area 
benefit all three.
Recent policy developments, including 
Resolution 2272 and Secretary-General 
Guterres’ ‘new approach’ to SEA are 
promising, in that they establish consequences 
for TCCs not pursuing robust accountability 
processes for personnel accused of SEA, 
put victims at the centre of UN responses, 
and demonstrate a renewed commitment 
from the UN’s leadership to preventing and 
ensuring accountability for SEA in future 
peace operations. However, these policies 
risk repeating the same mistakes of past 
SEA policies by reinforcing the individualised, 
conduct and discipline approach, and thereby 
failing to recognise and address the complex 
mix of permissive and motivating factors 
that give rise to SEA, and addressing the 
political, bureaucratic and logistical reasons 
for the current accountability deficit. The 
Secretary-General’s new approach does, 
however, lay the groundwork for changing 
this, in its acknowledgement that unequal 
gender relations lie at the heart of SEA, and 
by connecting the response to the increased 
participation of women in UN activities, 
including as armed peacekeepers, which may 
pave the way for changing the perceptions 
of women’s roles and agency in post-conflict 
contexts. Nevertheless, it is notable that the 
‘visible and measurable’ improvements that 
the report suggests the UN will develop focus 
primarily on training, conduct protocols 
and reporting mechanisms, which may be 
undermined in similar ways previous policies 
have been. 
Building stronger connections between WPS 
and SEA at operational and institutional 
levels would go some way to rectifying the 
failings of SEA policies to date, by situating 
them within a broader analysis of and 
concern for the intersecting set of gendered 
and other dynamics that lead to women’s 
disenfranchisement and the particular 
vulnerabilities they face in conflict and post-
conflict environments. Linking SEA with 
CRSV frameworks is crucial to embedding 
a victim-centred, human rights-based 
approach into accountability processes. 
Furthermore, harmonising these various 
arenas of policy and operational work would 
help limit the inevitable competition for 
resources that affects gender-related work, 
and would help maximise the political will 
available to ensure both participation and 
protection of women and children in conflict 
and post-conflict environments.
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
KNOW THE RULES: THERE iS NO ExcUSE! 
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!
More information: https://conduct.unmissions.org
At all times we must treat the local 
population with respect and dignity.
Sexual exploitation and abuse 
is unacceptable behaviour and 
prohibited conduct for all United 
Nations and affiliated personnel. 
Sexual exploitation and abuse 
threatens the lives of people that we 
are to serve and protect. 
Sexual exploitation and abuse 
undermines discipline, and damages 
the reputation of the United Nations.
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Excerpt from ‘Conduct in 
Field Missions’ pamphlet.
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